Signing in without a password
From 2014 to today, three ways of being recognised by a site by signing instead of typing: BitID, LNURL-auth and passkeys. What they sign, where the key lives, and what they don't protect against.
A password is a shared secret: you know it and, in some form, the site knows it too. If the site loses its database, or if you type it into a fake page, the secret becomes someone else's.
With a signature the site keeps only your public key. At every login it sends you a random number, the challenge, and you sign it with the private key, which never leaves your device. Stealing the site's database is of no use: it holds only public keys, and a signature is good for one challenge only.
Anyone who uses Bitcoin already has a signing key in their pocket. The idea of using it to log in to sites came early.
2014: BitID
On 31 March 2014 the first description of BitID, the Bitcoin Authentication Open Protocol, written by Eric Larchevêque, appeared on GitHub.1 The site shows a QR code with an address like this:
bitid://www.site.com/callback?x=7deba363a7162b58
x is the nonce, the number that is valid only once. The wallet signs the whole address with the key of a bitcoin address, in Bitcoin's signed-message format, and sends the site the address and the signature. The site checks the signature: from that moment you are that address.
In the 2018 developer course BitID was one of the notebooks in the materials: generate the nonce, sign with a testnet address, verify. The nonce above comes from there.2 But the protocol was already stalled. The draft stayed “pre-draft” and never became a BIP. To get a different key for every site the draft points to a SatoshiLabs standard, SLIP-13: a wallet that didn't follow it used the same address everywhere, and two sites could tell they had the same user. Bitcoin's signed messages, besides, really exist only for addresses of the oldest type, those starting with 1. The repository has been idle since February 2016.
2019: LNURL-auth
LNURL was born in early 2019 from Anton Kumaigorodski, the author of Simple Bitcoin Wallet: a way of putting into a QR code everything a Lightning wallet needs to talk to a service, to withdraw, pay, open a channel, and also to log in.3
For login the site shows an LNURL containing tag=login, a k1 challenge of 32 random bytes and, if it wants, the action: register, log in, link an account. The wallet shows the name of the site and asks for confirmation; then it signs k1 with secp256k1, Bitcoin's curve, and calls the site with the signature and the public key. The site must accept each challenge only once.4
The difference from BitID lies in the key. The wallet doesn't use an address: from its seed it derives a dedicated key for every site. First a service key, on the path m/138'/0; with that it computes the HMAC-SHA256 of the site's name; the first 16 bytes become four numbers, and the four numbers the path of the site's key.5 Two sites see two keys with nothing in common, and neither can know that the same person is behind them. Whoever logs in gives no email, no name, no password.
You need JavaScript for the experiment.
The name that counts is the full one: auth.site.com and login.site.com give two keys, that is, two accounts. The specification warns services to choose a subdomain and never change it.4 The identity, besides, is tied to the wallet's seed: if you lose the seed, you lose the account. And changing wallet isn't always enough to take it with you: wallets have seeds of different formats, and the specification itself admits that portability, in practice, doesn't work out. For wallets that can't use the seed this way there is a second recipe, LUD-13.
2022: passkeys
On 4 March 2019 the W3C approved WebAuthn, the standard with which the browser asks an authenticator to create and use keys for sites.6 For a few years it was used mostly by hardware keys. On 5 May 2022 Apple, Google and Microsoft announced that they would bring those keys into their systems, synchronised across devices. The press release notes that some already call them passkeys, and the name stuck.7
The scheme is the same: a key pair for every site, a challenge, a signature. Two things change. The private key sits in the phone or the computer, often in a dedicated chip, and is unlocked with a fingerprint, a face or a PIN. And above all the browser asks for the signature, not the page: the browser puts into the signed data the real address of the page asking for the login. On a fake site, the passkey of the real site doesn't even fire.
The forwarded QR
On one point the three methods are not equal: the forwarded QR, which OWASP calls QRLJacking. It works with any login done by scanning a QR code:8
- The attacker opens the real site's login page and takes its QR code, with its challenge.
- They put it on a page of their own, with a pretext: “scan to claim your prize”.
- The victim scans it. The wallet shows the name of the real site, because the QR is real, and the victim confirms.
- The site receives a valid signature and lets in the session that had asked for that QR: the attacker's.
BitID and LNURL-auth can't notice: the wallet sees the QR, not who showed it. With a passkey on the same device the problem doesn't exist, because the signature carries the page's address. And when the passkey is on the phone and the login is on the computer, the protocol asks the two to prove with Bluetooth that they are close. The specification explains it with exactly this case: without the proximity check, a site could show a QR and talk you into scanning it.9
Side by side
| BitID | LNURL-auth | Passkey | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where the key is | in the bitcoin wallet | in the Lightning wallet's seed | in the device, or in the password manager that syncs it |
| One key per site | only if the wallet follows SLIP-13 | yes, derived from the site's name | yes, created for that site |
| The forwarded QR | gets through | gets through | stopped: the browser also signs the page's address |
| If you lose the device | you need the seed | you need the seed | you need the sync, or another way to log in |
| Who you depend on | the wallet | the wallet, and its way of deriving keys | Apple, Google, Microsoft or your password manager |
| What the site knows about you | a bitcoin address | a public key | a public key, and usually the email you gave it |
What bitmentor offers
bitmentor, the free software for communities that accept bitcoin in shops, uses each of these methods where it fits best. Here is what the program can do in version 0.3.0, not how one particular site uses it: each community chooses what to switch on.10
- Shop owners log in with LNURL-auth, or with a link that arrives by email. An account opened with email can link up to five wallets. For those who log in with the wallet, their key is the account: no password to remember.
- The team of a site still under construction, if the community switches the feature on, logs in with an invitation accepted by signing with the wallet. The signature gives the browser a one-week pass to see the site, and nothing else: no shop, no rights in the administration panel. With the same key, if the community wants it, volunteers open a work area made for the phone.
- The administration panel always asks for the password and, as a second factor, a passkey, a code from an authenticator app (TOTP), or both. The community can make the second factor mandatory, and can accept only passkeys: a code can be read out to a fake page, a passkey can't.
- For trials with a few friends there is a “hobby” level: an administrator without a second factor can enter the panel with their own wallet instead of the password, but only from a browser they have already logged in to with the password, so a QR forwarded to another browser opens nothing. When the second factor is mandatory, the wallet never opens the panel.
And the forwarded QR, for shop owners? The documentation puts it openly among the program's limits. Whoever talks a shop owner into scanning a code shown on someone else's screen lets that other browser in, in their place. The code lasts five minutes. Whoever got in this way can change the shop's Lightning address once every seven days, and not secretly: the owner is warned by email and in the shop's chats, and the till's phone stops until they confirm the new address.11 The practical rule stays one: a login code is scanned only on the device you are logging in on.
Which one to use
For a service meant for people who already have a Lightning wallet, LNURL-auth is convenient and respects privacy more than the other two: no email, no data, a different key for every site. It's fine for commenting, voting, entering a members' area. For a panel that moves money or changes other people's things, on its own it isn't enough: you need a passkey or a second factor, and a separate confirmation for every action that can't be undone.
BitID is history today, but it remains the simplest way to understand the other two: a challenge, a signature, a public key in place of the password.
To practise with signatures, hashes and keys there is Sealed envelope; for the message hidden in spaces, Steganography.
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bitid/bitid, the README and the draft
BIP_draft.md(“Status: Pre-draft”), read on 20 November 2026. The repository's first commit is from 31 March 2014, the last from 8 February 2016. ↩ -
bcademy course, “bitid” notebook from the materials, November 2018; inbitcoin archive. The notebook used the
pybitidandpython-bitcoinliblibraries. ↩ -
lnurl/luds, the specifications repository, created on 6 January 2019; in 2021 the rules were split into numbered documents, the LUDs. Read on 20 November 2026. ↩
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LUD-04, by Anton Kumaigorodski: the sections on choosing the subdomain and on deriving
linkingKey. Read on 20 November 2026. ↩↩ -
LUD-05, by Anton Kumaigorodski, with the test vector that the experiment reproduces. Read on 20 November 2026. ↩
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Web Authentication, Level 1, W3C Recommendation of 4 March 2019. ↩
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FIDO Alliance, press release of 5 May 2022: FIDO credentials “referred to by some as a "passkey"”. ↩
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OWASP, QRLJacking, read on 20 November 2026. ↩
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FIDO Alliance, Client to Authenticator Protocol 2.2, the hybrid transport. ↩
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bitmentor 0.3.0, the feature list, team access and staff and shops, read on 20 November 2026. ↩
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bitmentor 0.3.0, Limitations, the point on wallet login. ↩